Circular Migration and the Gulf States by Gardner, Andrew M & Babar, Zahra
University of Puget Sound
Sound Ideas
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
2016
Circular Migration and the Gulf States
Andrew M. Gardner
University of Puget Sound, gardner@pugetsound.edu
Zahra Babar
Georgetown University, Zahra.Babar@georgetown.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/faculty_pubs
Part of the International Relations Commons, Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons, and
the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Sound Ideas. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Sound Ideas. For more information, please contact soundideas@pugetsound.edu.
Citation
Babar, Zahra and Andrew Gardner (2016) Circular Migration and the Gulf States. In Impact of Circular Migration on Human, Political
and Civil Rights. C. Sole et al. (eds.) United Nations University Series of Regionalism 12.
45© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 
C. Solé et al. (eds.), Impact of Circular Migration on Human, 
Political and Civil Rights, United Nations University Series on Regionalism 12, 
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-28896-3_3
 Chapter 3 
 Circular Migration and the Gulf States 
 Zahra  Babar and  Andrew  Gardner 
 Abstract  In this chapter the authors assess the application of the circular migration 
framework to the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. By some estimations, the 
six GCC states comprise the third largest migratory destination in the contemporary 
world, and for decades these states have hosted large transient migrant populations 
that, in some manner or another, appear to fi t the defi nition of circular migration. 
Through an analysis of migration to the Gulf States this chapter provides an empiri-
cal contribution to the expanding discussion of circular migration. In this chapter 
the nexus between the Gulf migration system and the circular migration framework 
is confi gured around two focal points. After an overview of migration in the Gulf 
States, the authors fi rst examine the policy frameworks that regulate and govern 
migration to the GCC. Second, using an ethnographic lens, the authors explore the 
experiences of the migrants at work in the region. They conclude with a discussion 
of the implications of promoting the circular migration framework in the region. 
3.1  Introduction: Circular Migration and the Arabian 
Peninsula 
 Migration and movement have emerged as central to our understanding of the con-
temporary world. In the wake of this tectonic shift, scholars now work amidst a 
spectrum of conceptual frameworks that seek to grasp the various aspects of these 
movements and their characteristics. Alongside frameworks such as transnational-
ism, cosmopolitanism, and diaspora studies, the  circular migration framework 
seeks to grapple with the phenomena of contemporary movement. It stakes its claim 
to a conceptual and analytic space around the fundamental assertion that migrations 
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of the past – movements that oftentimes led to the permanent settlement of migrants 
in the receiving country – have given way to temporary, ephemeral, and/or circular 
patterns that, eventually, carry migrants back to their original home. Indeed, it is 
that enduring connection and an eventual return to the homeland that is the hallmark 
of the circular migration framework. 
 The conceptualization of the migrant as enduringly connected to home and, more 
precisely, facing a horizon of eventual return, provides some balance against the 
longstanding anxieties that accompany the dominant, western, and social scientifi c 
understandings of migration. As Feldman argues, the “fantasy” of circular migra-
tion assuages nationalist anxieties in its promise that migrants will eventually leave, 
and it assuages neoliberal anxieties by maintaining an inexpensive pool of available 
labor ( 2012 ). But circular migration also addresses the broader anxiety that, through 
migration, families, communities, and sometimes nations themselves are perma-
nently destabilized by the movement and absence of their constituent members/citi-
zens. Indeed, the circular migration framework is often portrayed (and critiqued) as 
overly laudatory of migration and movement, for it suggests positive outcomes for 
all: sending countries generate income, receiving countries address labor shortages, 
and migrants themselves are empowered with income and agency (Vertovec  2007 ). 
Faced with the de facto reality of unstoppable migration and movement beyond the 
state’s control, policymakers and scholars have found a particular enthusiasm for 
circular migration and its promise that, with the right confi guration of policies, ben-
efi ts can be reaped by all. 
 As a conceptual framework that frames contemporary movement in particular 
ways, circular migration also accepts the nation-state as the predominant organiza-
tional unit in the world, and unlike transnational theory, envisions the state as 
unthreatened by these migratory circuits and movements. Whereas transnational 
theory and cosmopolitanism portray the movement of people as a contemporary and 
neoliberal reality that poses signifi cant challenges to the nation-state (e.g. Ong 
 2006 ; Sassen  1998 ,  2001 ; Pries  2001 ; Basch et al.  1994 ), the circular migration 
framework centrally positions the nation-state in its calculus. Indeed, the steadfast 
maintenance of this methodological nationalism is characteristic of the circular 
migration discourse, and while this feature is central to its popularity in policy- 
oriented circles (most of which are also highly invested in the operation of the 
nation-state), it is perhaps also the measure of its less enthusiastic acceptance 
amongst many academically focused scholars. 
 In this chapter, we explore the application of the circular migration framework to 
the petroleum-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to the qualities 
and characteristics we describe above, the circular migration framework, like most 
migration theory, has largely been constructed on an empirical foundation that, in 
geographical terms, is concerned principally with those migratory circuits con-
nected to Europe and North America. By some estimations, the six GCC states (that 
is, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman) com-
prise the third largest migratory destination 1 in the contemporary world, and for 
1  See ESCWA ( 2007 ). 
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decades these states have hosted large transient migrant populations that, in some 
manner or another, appear to fi t the defi nition of circular migration. 
 With all of this in mind, we see an analysis of migration to the Gulf States as a 
vital empirical contribution to the expanding discussion of circular migration. Our 
analysis of the nexus between the Gulf migration system and the circular migration 
framework is confi gured around two focal points. After an overview of migration in 
the Gulf States, we fi rst examine the policy frameworks that regulate and govern 
migration to the GCC. Second, using an ethnographic lens, we explore the experi-
ences of the migrants at work in the region. We conclude with a discussion of the 
challenges and implications of framing Gulf migration in the circular migration 
framework. 2 
3.2  An Overview of Migration in the Gulf States 
 The cities of the Arabian littoral have been enmeshed in regional and trans-regional 
networks of exchange and mobility for millennia. Those networks carried all sorts 
of people to the shores of Arabia – merchants, traders, and slaves at fi rst; colonial 
bureaucrats, technicians and professionals later. Indeed, while migration is often 
conceived as characteristic of the modern era, even a passing familiarity with the 
history of the port cities of the Arabian Peninsula suggests that the transnational 
migration fl ows that characterize the contemporary Gulf States are merely another 
chapter in a long history of movement and mobility. Amidst that historical continu-
ity, however, the past four decades merit particular attention. While many of the 
historic migratory conduits that carried the aforementioned populations to Arabia 
persevere in some form or other, all were dwarfed by the changes wrought in the 
concluding decades of the twentieth century. Petroleum industries in the region 
were by that time highly productive and extremely lucrative, the various GCC states 
were newly independent, and the OPEC embargo multiplied the wealth these 
nations controlled overnight. At that historical juncture, all the GCC States embarked 
on vast infrastructural modernization projects that were deeply interwoven with 
their new national identities. In turn, those modernization projects required a vast 
labor force of unskilled and low-skill workers. Building on established ties to South 
Asia, the migratory conduits connecting India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
2 A string of research projects underpin this research. Those projects were funded and sponsored 
by a variety of institutions, including the Fulbright Program, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, the 
Bahrain Training Institute, Qatar University, and the Center for International and Regional Studies 
at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. In addition, this paper relies 
heavily on research funded by the Qatar National Research Fund under its National Priorities 
Research Program (award number NPRP 09-857-5-123). Note that the contents of this chapter are 
solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the offi cial views of the 
Qatar National Research Fund, nor any of the other institutions that have supported the research 
underpinning this chapter. 
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and Nepal to these Arabian states swelled in the fi nal decades of the twentieth 
century. 
 Today, foreigners predominate in all the GCC workforces. Foreign labor com-
prises an absolute majority of all six GCC nations’ workforces, and the foreign 
population comprises an absolute majority of the population in Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates (Kapiszewski  2001 ). These proportions are quite extraor-
dinary – current estimates, for example, suggest that over 90 % of the population in 
Qatar is non-citizen. The foreign populations at work in the Gulf are geographically 
and demographically diverse. Atop the foundation of South Asian labor, the GCC 
states now draw increasingly large components of their contemporary labor forces 
from Sub-saharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the Middle 
East. Much of this foreign labor force arrives to work unskilled positions – these 
migrants work as construction workers, truck drivers, domestic servants, offi ce 
boys, custodians, and countless other positions. More lucrative skilled and profes-
sional positions are occupied by citizens or elite foreigners, typically of Middle 
Eastern, European, North American, or South Asian descent. Although naturaliza-
tion is typically not possible for foreign migrants, many of the elite foreign popula-
tions have found ways to remain in the Gulf for several generations, and hence 
maintain a diasporic footprint in the region. 3 Those men and women working 
unskilled or semi-skilled positions often remain in the Gulf for much shorter peri-
ods of time. 
 Migration to the region is organized and governed by the kafala, or sponsorship 
system. This system mandates an association between each labor migrant and a 
sponsor/resident in the Gulf. This system of sponsorship, with longstanding roots in 
the cultural traditions of the region, is practically reinforced by the labor contracts 
that lock migrants to particular jobs for a particular period of time. Typical contracts 
are 2 years in duration. Overall, the kafala (and the labor contracts that underlie it) 
directly associates the individual migrant with a particular job and particular spon-
sor. The highly unequal power dynamics of these relations have been the focus of 
much research in the region, and are often portrayed as the keystone in the exploit-
ative labor relations common in the contemporary Gulf States (Longva  1997 ,  1999 ; 
Frantz  2008 ; Gardner  2010a ). Several of the Gulf States are currently amidst discus-
sions concerning pathways to dismantling or substantially altering the sponsorship 
system. At the same time, decades of migration under the sponsorship system have 
lodged these practices as normative throughout the region, and the business com-
munities of several Gulf States have publically argued that their economic competi-
tiveness in the global arena would be signifi cantly diminished if the sponsorship 
system were abandoned. 4 
3  There are limited opportunities for naturalization in some GCC states, but generally speaking, 
these opportunities are not available to the vast majority of labor migrants who stream to the 
region. 
4  See Gardner ( 2010a : 159–164) and Beaugrand ( 2011 ) for a longer discussion of Bahrain’s claims 
regarding the abolishment of the sponsorship system. 
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 The portion of this migration system discernible in the Gulf States is one part of 
a larger transnational migration system that reaches deep into Asia and Africa. 
Through manpower agencies and labor brokerages in those sending countries, 
potential migrants are routed to work in the GCC States. 5 Labor brokerages in sen-
ding countries oftentimes employ sub-agents who scour more peripheral villages 
and towns for potential labor migrants. These labor brokerages, in communication 
with manpower companies and other employers in the Gulf, extract profi ts from the 
migration process. Gulf-based employers and sponsors also commonly extract prof-
its from the migration process. Unskilled and low-skill migrants typically pay 
$1500–$3000 for the right to a 2-year work contract in the Gulf States. In the longer 
history of Gulf migration, the commodifi cation of the right to work in the region 
became commonplace in the 1990s, and is therefore a recent development. The 
amounts paid for this “right” vary between sending nations. Typically, migrants and 
their families incur signifi cant debts in securing funds for this journey. Those debts 
are held in the sending countries, and, in the form of mortgages or loans, typically 
encompass vital productive resources and household-level savings. 
 Sustained analysis of this migration system suggests the relationships it struc-
tures are prone to abuse and exploitation (Gardner  2010a ; Longva  1997 ,  1999 ; 
Human Rights Watch  2006 ,  2009 ). By locking migrants to a particular sponsor and 
job, the kafala prevents migrants from escaping exploitative situations. While a full 
review of the patterns of these migrants’ experiences is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, systematic research clearly points to a set of recurring issues migrants 
encounter throughout the region. 6 Labor migrants oftentimes face the non-payment 
of wages; others face underpayment in relation to the contractually promised salary. 
Migrants’ passports are typically confi scated by their employer or sponsor, thereby 
preventing them from fl eeing exploitative labor relations. Others are summarily 
deported by their sponsors. Housing is oftentimes substandard, and work conditions 
can be unsafe. Migrants are often retained against their will beyond the contractu-
ally delineated 2 years. “Jobswitching” – arriving in the Gulf to a different job than 
promised in the sending country – is commonplace. And various deductions, often 
for contractually promised benefi ts, signifi cantly reduce the meager profi ts prom-
ised to labor migrants. As a result, this migration system has been a locus of inter-
national critique, and the Gulf States perennially occupy the lower tiers of the 
U.S. Department of State’s human traffi cking report and other similar measures. 
 It is undoubtedly true that millions of labor migrants successfully navigate the 
risks and vulnerabilities of this migration system, and that remittances from the 
GCC states comprise a vital feature of household, community, and indeed, national 
5  There is often confusion with these terms. We use labor brokerages to refer to those agencies in 
sending countries that connect potential migrants with employment in the Gulf states, a service for 
which they typically charge. Manpower companies refer to those companies that receive labor in 
the Gulf states. These manpower agencies are oftentimes also referred to as labor supply compa-
nies. They employ labor, often in large quantities, and contract with companies to provide labor 
services. 
6  See Longva  1997 ,  1999 ; Gardner  2010a ,  b ,  2011 ,  2012 ; U.S. Department of State  2007 ; Human 
Rights Watch  2006 ,  2009 . 
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economies in South Asia, portions of Africa, and much of the Middle East. But 
those risks and vulnerabilities are substantial, and many of them are directly tied to 
the transience and circularity that characterizes the migration system in the Gulf 
States. Indeed, as we will argue below, many of the policy tools and procedures 
promoted by circular migration schemes are the very same tools that currently 
structure highly unequal and potentially exploitative labor relations in the 
GCC. Through an examination of the policy framework that governs this migration 
fl ow, and through an ethnographically-focused analysis of the Gulf migration expe-
rience, we portray the circularity of this migration system as a manifestation of 
exploitative labor relations rather than as a freedom to be enhanced through policy 
confi guration. 
3.3  Policy and the Governance of Migrants in the GCC 
 As some Gulf scholars have noted, any discussion of the state of migration policy 
and governance in the GCC states must fi rst address the marked disconnect between 
articulated or implemented macro-level policy and the reality practiced on the 
ground. Clearly the Gulf States, boasting the third largest migration hub in the 
world, are developing and implementing migration policy at the macro level. The 
primary concerns of this macro level policy are to curtail the heightened depen-
dency on foreign labor sources, to ensure a more balanced representation of their 
own citizenry in the national workforce, and to mitigate against the threat of cultural 
or socio-political dislocation that hosting large numbers of foreigners might entail. 
As a result of these foundational concerns, macro-level policies are geared towards 
minimizing the possibility of migrant integration and blocking pathways to perma-
nent settlement and citizenship, toward the “nationalization” of the respective coun-
tries’ workforces, and toward establishing strategic limitations on the numbers of 
workers from one source country (Shah  2008 ). Macro-level policy does not ade-
quately address the fact that migrants have continued to be a highly visible presence 
in this region for more than three decades, that this does not appear to be a “tempo-
rary” phenomena, and that the forces driving these migration fl ows will not be dis-
sipating in the near future (Forstenlechner and Rutledge  2011 ). 
 Ethnographic research amongst migrant populations in the GCC points to the 
extremely weak impact of this policy on their lives. Analyses suggest that many 
migrants experience the GCC as an ungoverned space where they are left to the 
devices and desires of the marketplace, where in fact a host of social and economic 
actors have vested interests in ensuring that the state and its policies have limited 
force. The weakness of this governance structure is embedded in the fact that over 
the past decades the Gulf States have exhibited a marked lack of interest in prioritiz-
ing migrants’ rights and protections (Winckler  1997 ). Until recently the preferred 
option for the state was to maintain a hands-off approach that, through the kafala, 
distributed the responsibility of governing the migrant labor force to individual 
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citizen-sponsors (Gardner  2010a ). As Neha Vora ( 2010 ) has articulated, this arrange-
ment yields the ‘privatization of migrant governance’ which allows the state to 
absolve itself of responsibility and actively enables the exploitation of migrant 
workers (see also Gardner  2010a ,  b ). 
 More recently the Gulf States have opted for more direct involvement in gover-
nance of regional migration. This has led to a region-wide discussion on how the 
kafala system might be modifi ed or eliminated entirely, and what new system might 
replace it (Baldwin-Edwards  2011 ). In light of mounting international criticism 
over the living and working conditions for many migrant workers in the region, the 
Gulf States have argued in their defense that existing labor laws protect basic rights 
of foreign workers by defi ning maximum work hours, by setting minimum health, 
safety, and environment standards, by ensuring the timely delivery of wages, and by 
mandating practice in other potential areas of contention. If employers are not abid-
ing by the law or are denying their employees their due rights, then judicial mecha-
nisms exist through which the workers may seek recourse (Ahmad  2010 ). 
Considering the fact that salary and contractual disputes remain central areas of 
concern for labor migrants and their advocates, an enabled legal structure could 
play a signifi cant role in adjudicating many of the problems migrants face. At the 
current juncture, however, the courts are not the mechanism of redress preferred by 
migrants, but rather a last resort that is oftentimes altogether neglected. Whether 
due to limited capacity or disinterest, the GCC states have been unable to ensure 
compliance with many of their own policies (such as labor laws), and have failed to 
enact policy that would provide greater protection for foreign workers (Rahman 
 2010 ). Framing effective policy specifi cally tailored to improving workers’ rights 
and protections and, perhaps more importantly, building state capacity to ensure 
employers comply with these polices, would be better than continued reliance on 
the legal mechanisms alone. 
 Three Tiers of Infl uence  The rights and interests informing migration management 
and policy development in the GCC States can be conceptualized in three tiers. At 
the fi rst tier we see the rights of the sovereign state being asserted. Migration is a 
contested area where sovereign rights tend to dominate policy-making. A state’s 
internal and domestic agenda may exert primacy, but migration policy is also deter-
mined by a second tier of interests which exists at the regional level. In the Gulf the 
primary regional entity is the Gulf Cooperation Council. While the GCC has to date 
not implemented a harmonized policy platform on migration, the manner in which 
migration to the region is managed is in essence informally harmonized (Babar 
 2011 ). The six member states have all relied on the kafala system to regulate 
migrants’ rights of entry into the territory, and to act as the structural mechanism in 
which temporary labor migration is grounded. The third tier of interests or rights 
exerted over migration management in the Gulf comes from the international 
domain. Over the decades the international realm has increasingly intervened in the 
debate around migration, both in terms of laying parameters for policymaking and 
setting the norms of what is acceptable behavior for states to engage in. 
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 National Context  Migration policy in the GCC has primarily developed within the 
national context, and there is little doubt that each state maintains fi rm control over 
entry and workforce participation within its territorial boundaries. Although they 
have developed migration policies individually, those policies remain quite similar, 
largely because the national contexts in which those respective migration policies 
developed are quite similar. One common thread woven through much of the dis-
cussion of migration in the GCC concerns the “demographic imbalance” present in 
the national labor markets and population structure, as well as the disproportionally 
large populations of non-national workers (Forstenlechner and Rutledge  2011 ). 
Although these large workforces have been present for decades, the Gulf States do 
not see themselves as destinations for permanent settlement: these migrant popula-
tions are recurrently framed as a temporary historical circumstance. The six states 
are unequivocal regarding their aspirations to build a citizen workforce, and thereby 
alleviate their ongoing dependency on foreign labor. Until that goal can be realized, 
however, the guiding principle around migration management is one that strives to 
ensure that the large, foreign workforce currently dominating the Gulf labor market 
remains strictly temporary in nature, and the pathways to permanent settlement are 
almost non-existent. 
 In both law and everyday practice, this migration system refl ects the deep anxiet-
ies felt by the regimes and citizenries faced with a signifi cant demographic imbal-
ance within their own societies. In turn, these anxieties of the host state are 
reproduced as pressures felt by the foreign workforce. As is discussed elsewhere in 
the paper, the kafala creates an environment where foreign workers are prone to 
exploitation at the hands of their employers. Our argument is that the temporary 
nature of these visa arrangements plays an integral role in the widespread exploita-
tion many labor migrants encounter in the region. Employers can count on the fact 
that migrant workers have invested heavily in the opportunity to come to the Gulf 
for employment, and are therefore reluctant to leave without some return on their 
investment within the allocated time period. Sponsors are thus empowered to 
exploit the anxieties of those they sponsor. 
 Regional Context  While the GCC states have not to date formally harmonized poli-
cies for managing migration, they have begun to take a more proactive role in 
addressing the issue as a bloc. Perhaps this is in belated recognition of the fact that 
all of the states face similar concerns around migration, as well as the fact that they 
are collectively the target of a stream of criticism leveled at them for their supposed 
apathy in protecting migrant workers. Regardless, during the past few years the 
GCC states have initiated regional cooperative efforts at migration policy reform. In 
2005, fi ve of the six GCC countries, as observers, attended the annual meeting held 
under the Colombo Process. The Colombo Process brings together a number of 
migrant-sending countries of Asia, and is primarily concerned with the protection of 
overseas workers. Building on this involvement, and spearheaded by the United 
Arab Emirates, all six of the GCC states in 2008 launched the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. 
The Abu Dhabi Dialogue is a regional consultative process on labor migration to the 
Gulf. It serves to bring labor sending countries from South and Southeast Asia 
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together with labor receiving countries of the Gulf, with the aim of addressing the 
concerns of both. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue however, evolved primarily as a response 
to increasing international sounds of alarm around migration management in the 
Gulf, as opposed to out of strictly GCC-based concerns. 
 Global Context  A host of international organizations focused on migration have 
developed under the UN umbrella, including the International Labour Organisation 
and the International Organisation for Migration. Such international efforts have 
created an atmosphere where recognition is consistently given to the fact that migra-
tion is a global phenomenon affecting states everywhere, and accordingly interna-
tional cooperative mechanisms for coping with migration are required. 
 While migration policy in the Gulf States developed in response to specifi c 
national and region-wide challenges, it is also informed by broader, global shifts in 
the discourse on migration. Throughout the world peoples’ mobility across borders 
is more and more scrutinized and embedded in issues of state sovereignty and gov-
ernance. Borders are being made less permeable, channels for permanent settlement 
for new migrants are being narrowed, pathways to inclusion and participation pared 
down, and criterion for citizenship made more stringent. 
 Beyond the impersonal machinery of the state clamping down on potential 
migrants, it is the strong anti-immigration bent to the public discourse in the devel-
oped world that indirectly supports these policies. Much of this hinges on anxieties 
of governments and citizenry around the presence of new streams of migrants who 
could become eligible for rights of full citizenship and place added pressures on the 
socio-economic and political capacity of the state. Framing migration as a threat to 
the development of politically and economically viable societies is a global phe-
nomenon that is leading to a global climate of migration fear. This underlying global 
trend justifi es the rationality of anti-migration sentiment elsewhere, such as in the 
Gulf. 
 Concurrently, neoliberal globalization creates greater economic co- dependencies. 
Economic policies encourage the free fl ow of capital and labor. Migration policies 
curtailing the movement of people, and potentially limiting sources of skilled and 
low-skill labor could have critical consequences on economic development across 
the world. Governments have been searching for migration policies that suit their 
national interests and support the fl ow of temporary labor migrants rather than per-
manent ones. Circular migration policies certainly suit contemporary circumstances, 
as they remove the need for integration, marginalize pathways to citizenship, and 
reinforce the concept of migrants’ return to their countries of origin. 
 While circular migration is not a new concept, it has over the recent past gained 
ground in policy circles (Vertovec  2007 ). Its popularity is a result of the fact that it 
addresses the economic needs of both migrant sending and receiving countries, 
while framing temporary migrants as a dynamic, voluntarily transnational work- 
force. This temporary work-force moves fl uidly between two or more countries for 
employment and residence purposes, not only oiling the wheels of an effi cient 
 globalised economy, but also contributing to development in both the sending and 
receiving state. 
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 Circular Migration and Gulf Policy Development  Proponents of circular migration 
posit that, given the right circumstances, transnational workers greatly benefi t from 
temporary cycles of employment abroad. From this perspective, the obstacles to 
successful circularity are in the bad policies and practices that hamper workers from 
benefi ting most from the experience, and do not create long term improved develop-
ment trajectories. Advocates argue that undertaking constructive efforts which sup-
port seamless circular migration may prove that temporary periods of migration are 
benefi cial for labor-surplus sending countries, labor-defi cient receiving countries, 
and the migrant laborers themselves. 
 The circular migration framework suggests the traditional and conventional 
view – that international employment is viewed by migrants primarily as a gateway 
to permanent residency and citizenship – is outdated and not applicable to all con-
temporary contexts. Migrants are portrayed as agents of their own destiny, and the 
undertaking of temporary periods of employment outside their homeland is defi ned 
as an active choice rather than one resulting from the limited pathways open to 
them. Despite this framing of repeated and temporary periods of migration as the 
result of voluntary choices made by workers in a global labor market, it is of note 
that existing circular migration schemes have arisen specifi cally in regions which 
need to meet their labor market needs, which are labor defi cient and yet do not want 
to offer permanent settlement. Additionally, and in spite of the attention given to 
migrants’ welfare while in a host country, there can be no denying that the circular 
migration framework is principally lodged in the notion that migrants will return 
home. This framework highlights positive aspects of returning migrants, suggesting 
that they bring back to their countries of origin new skill sets, enhanced capacity, 
and capital investment. 
 Questions concerning the purportedly ‘voluntary’ nature of circular migrants’ 
behavior certainly arise if we view Gulf migration through this analytic lens. 
Migrants to the Gulf have almost no agency in terms of obtaining permanent settle-
ment or citizenship. This is particularly true for those migrants at the lower end of 
the income and skill scale. Current Gulf practices have removed pathways of tradi-
tional migration for settlement, and the kafala system is structured to only grant 
migrants opportunities for temporary cycles of employment. Migrants may choose 
to engage in repeated cycles of employment within one or more of the GCC states, 
interspersed with periods of repatriation home. It is impossible to determine whether 
these back and forth movements refl ect migrants’ preferences, as there is no option 
for them to remain long term in a host state. Unless empirical data emerges to the 
contrary, we cannot establish that current patterns of temporary labor migration to 
the Gulf region are based solely on migrants’ agency. Rather, it can be argued these 
patterns have emerged because there are no alternatives available. 
 If circular migration ascribes a great deal of agency to individual migrants in 
terms of decision-making around managing their processes of migration, it also 
centralizes the role of the state. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the state 
is seen as having extensive capacity for controlling migratory channels into and 
through its borders. Embedded within this notion is the presumption that states have 
the necessary power to adjust their policies and practices to achieve more  effective 
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management. Given our contention that current migratory processes to the Gulf are 
heavily infl uenced by non-state economic actors who are components in a transna-
tional migration industry, it is hard to assume that adjustment in state policies alone 
would dramatically alter the experiences of exploitation faced by migrants to 
the region. 
 Defi ning temporary labor migration cycles to the Arabian Peninsula as ‘circular 
migration’ would augur well for the receiving countries, for it would justify the 
status quo. Circular migration exists as part of our historical understanding of peo-
ple’s movements, as people have for centuries moved temporarily between two or 
more places, and have returned to their countries of origin. These patterns of migra-
tory behavior could be constructed as voluntary or as a result of structural necessity, 
but were seldom controlled or managed through the intrusion of the state. Circular 
migration as a current policy framework, however, has arisen amidst rising con-
cerns of states that wish to meet their labor needs without having to add to their 
actual population stock. It has largely emerged in liberal democracies seeking an 
alternate solution to the past experiences of temporary and guest worker programs, 
where labor defi cits might have been met but residual and unexpected consequences 
(such as the permanent settlement of workers) have placed added pressures on the 
receiving states. The Gulf States present a different scenario from the liberal demo-
cracies in Europe where much of the discussion on circular migration originates. 
Through the kafala system and through the restrictive controls that limit migrants 
from pathways to social integration and participation, the Gulf to a great extent has 
been able to successfully manage its temporary labor cycles and mitigate the overall 
impact of migrants on the state and society. Conceiving of current migration pat-
terns to the Gulf as being circular and embedding them within that discourse serves 
to reinforce or rather justify the policy intentions and practice of the states. 
 In critiquing policies that support temporary labor migration attention has been 
drawn to the fact that such policies automatically delimit migrant’s rights 
(Wickramasekara  2011 ). Ethnographic research in the Gulf substantiates policy 
studies which point out that temporary labor migrants (both in the Gulf and else-
where) have their rights constrained through the lack of workplace mobility (by 
being contracted to work for one specifi c employer), the lack of possibility to have 
visas issued for family members, the limited opportunities for up-skilling or job- 
place training, the absence of social security, and a host of other issues. These con-
cerns around issues of the absence of rights are not addressed in the circular 
migration framework. 
3.4  Gulf Migration in Social Context 
 Broadly speaking, circular migration’s analytic lens principally focuses on the end 
results of migration rather than the experience itself. 7 In contrast to that typical 
focus, this section of the paper highlights the lived experiences of migrants who, in 
7  In contrast to a human rights-based approach, for example. 
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some sense or another, fi t the patterns that typify circular migration. By examining 
“circular” migrants through an ethnographic lens, we follow anthropologist Sarah 
Willen’s proscription for a phenomenology of migration centered upon the experi-
ences and sentiments of migrants-as-agents ( 2007 ). This attention to the experience 
of Gulf migration leads to three interrelated critiques of the circular migration 
framework. First, we suggest that attention to the macroscopic “circular” patterns of 
Gulf migration elides the oftentimes problematic and exploitative experiences of 
individual labor migrants. Second, we assert that the circular migration discourse 
diverts attention from the profi t-seeking nature of a transnational migration indus-
try. Finally, in grappling with the transnationality of this system, we suggest that the 
ongoing valorization of circular migration fails to accommodate the fact that these 
migration systems, which are perhaps circular in character, essentially place the 
burden of the reproduction of the labor force utilized by the Gulf States back upon 
the shoulders of the sending countries. As these summaries suggest, we believe 
attention to the lived experience of Gulf migration points to some of the conceptual 
problems with the circular migration framework. These criticisms can most likely 
be extrapolated to other migration contexts in the contemporary world. 
 The departure point for this section of the chapter is a single migrant’s story. 
From an ethnographic standpoint, no particular labor migrant’s story, in all of its 
specifi city, can stand as representative of the diverse experiences of the millions of 
men and women who stream to the region each year in search of opportunity. 
Nonetheless, of the hundreds of labor migrants the authors of this chapter have 
interviewed and/or encountered over the years, there is nothing particularly extraor-
dinary about Vinod’s experiences in Arabia. Readers seeking a more comprehen-
sive portrait of labor migrants’ lives in the Gulf States are encouraged to consult the 
growing ethnographic literature concerned with this mobile population (Longva 
 1997 ; Gardner  2010a ,  b ,  2011 ,  2012 ; Nagy  1998 ; Bruslé  2008 ; Gamburd  2000 ). 
 Vinod 8 was born and raised in a village just beyond the outskirts of a minor city 
on the low Terai plain of southern Nepal. As a young man, he followed several oth-
ers from his village to a job in Saudi Arabia. Although he was promised a salary SR 
600 by the labor broker in Nepal, for 3.5 years in Saudi Arabia he toiled for SR 550 
a month. His stay was extended, largely against his will: after the fi rst 2 years, he 
had still not repaid the entirety of the loan he had incurred to come to Saudi Arabia 
in the fi rst place. And the company insisted that he must pay for his own return 
ticket. As a result, he stayed a year and a half beyond the original 2-year contract. 
When he fi nally extricated himself, he returned to Nepal with the intentions of never 
returning to Arabia. But by early 2008, circumstances forced him abroad again. His 
father, recently deceased, had steadily whittled away the family’s fortune with 
drinking and gambling; more recently, the family had invested heavily in his sister’s 
dowry via a combination of loans and mortgages. Now the family faced an eco-
nomic crisis of spiraling debt. Vinod had experience driving large trucks, and after 
contacting a labor brokerage in the nearby city, he secured a position in Qatar as a 
heavy truck driver. The debts incurred to this broker were substantial, but he fi gured 
8 A pseudonym. 
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that within a year he could begin to save some money. Vinod left Nepal almost 
immediately. Once he arrived in Qatar, he was taken directly to a labor camp at the 
far edge of the Industrial Area, a vast grid of heavy industry, light industry, and 
labor camps on the urban periphery of Doha. Conditions at the camp were diffi cult: 
six men to a room, itinerant electricity, and an insecure water supply were at the top 
of his list of concerns. 
 For 6 months Vinod drove a water truck to and from various construction sites in 
and near the city. Then, the company’s general manager, a Palestinian migrant him-
self, came and told all the drivers that they were using too much diesel. The man-
ager refused to calculate for the fact that the majority of their time on the road was 
spent in traffi c – and often at a standstill. The manager began to penalize them by 
deducting money from their salary. In protest, the men refused to drive under the 
imposed circumstances. Once they stopped driving, the company stopped paying 
the men. The drivers found their way to a labor court and fi led a case. The court case 
took an enormous amount of time and a substantial investment on the part of the 
men. Vinod borrowed from friends, and the fl ow of remittances to Nepal ceased. At 
one point, Vinod persuaded his roommates to sell their collective television so he 
could extract his share for court fees. For 6 months the men sat in the camp as their 
case percolated through the legal system. Finally, in early 2010, the case was 
resolved in their favor. Vinod would be going home with all the salary due to him. 
Good riddance to Qatar, he thought. But before he could depart, the general man-
ager of the company, a savvy and vengeful man, fi led a countersuit contending that 
Vinod had “misused QR 10,000 worth of diesel”. The manager’s intentions were to 
punish Vinod – with a new case in the courts, Vinod would be prevented from 
returning home. This spurious case against Vinod bounced through the court system 
in Qatar for another 2 months. The electricity at the camp was turned off during the 
day, so Vinod and the other unemployed drivers languished in the stifl ing heat of the 
summer as they awaited resolution. Finally the spurious case was dismissed, and 
Vinod and his fellow drivers were cleared for departure. He received several thou-
sand Qatari Riyals in court-ordered back pay, but most of that money went to the 
various friends and acquaintances who had loaned him money over the many 
months he had gone without pay. He boarded the plane home with less than QR 
500 in his pocket. 
 It is against the backdrop of Vinod’s story that we can begin to unpack our con-
tentions about the circular migration framework. First, like many transnational 
migrants in the Gulf, Vinod worked multiple contracts in the region. As his story 
indicates, he worked fi rst in Saudi Arabia, and then after several years back in 
Nepal, he obtained a second position in Qatar. From a distance, then, the work 
 histories of the many, many labor migrants like Vinod resemble the essential migra-
tion pattern at the conceptual foundation of circular migration perspective: their 
lives begin in the villages and towns of South Asia; they move back and forth 
between the Gulf States during their adult working life; they return home periodi-
cally, and oftentimes for good in the twilight of their lives. But only through the 
most problematic of analytic acrobatics could one conclude that Vinod’s experi-
ences in the Gulf were economically positive in nature. His time in Saudi Arabia 
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was extremely diffi cult, and his stay there was extended by over a year and a half 
from the original contract, against his will and desire. He returned home to a family 
that was plagued by debt. After several years of attempting to fi nd remunerative 
work in Nepal and in a household caught in a fi nancial cataclysm, he again left for 
the Gulf, this time with previous experience, the savviness of a veteran migrant, and 
high hopes. As his story suggests, however, in Qatar he faced dire economic cir-
cumstances for a second time, and by our last interview, it was clear that he would 
return to Nepal with almost nothing to show for his efforts. 
 The aggregation of these sorts of transnational movements comes to resemble 
the movements hypothesized by the circular migration framework and encouraged 
by likeminded policy analysts. From the vantage point of the labor migrant, how-
ever, these movements are understood quite differently – not as a form of elective 
movement between profi table work abroad and the comforts of home, but rather as 
a gauntlet of diffi cult and challenging circumstances with little guarantee of suc-
cess. Foremost, then, there is a striking lack of agency amongst many of these 
migrants. In the countries from which they come, for example, many potential 
migrants are lured to the Gulf with misinformation and disinformation; oftentimes 
families – and, more specifi cally in the South Asian context, parents – are primarily 
responsible for the decision to migrate to the Gulf. Once in Arabia, men and women 
are frequently trapped in extremely unequal relations. They are often unable to 
secure even their most basic rights. Many endure periods of illegality after abscond-
ing from untenable situations at the sole job they are legally allowed to work. 
 What appears to be a conscious decision for a long stay is, oftentimes, revealed 
as a series of economic catastrophes, located both at home and abroad in the Gulf, 
that are a direct result of the exploitative relations that lock the migrant in a never- 
ending cycle of debt-driven servitude. And like Vinod, many migrants return home 
not to reconnect with family and community, but rather to fl ee those exploitative 
labor relations, or, in other cases, through the cancellation of their sponsorship and 
residency. These labor migrants display little control over their departure to the 
Gulf – economic penury and, more broadly, the failure of development compels 
them to leave their homes. And they display little agency in the decision to return 
home – sponsors and employers cancel their visas, police round up workers who 
have absconded from exploitative labor relations and deport them to their homes. 
As this suggests, our fi rst contention is that the circular migration framework is inat-
tentive to the lived experience of labor migration which, in the Gulf States, is char-
acterized by highly unequal and oftentimes exploitative relations between foreign 
workers and their sponsors. 
 Vinod’s story also indicates how ethnographic work amongst unskilled labor 
migrants compels us to grapple with this transnational migration system as a profi t- 
seeking industry – an industry in which labor is the commodity. Here we draw on 
William Walters’ insightful work on deportation, in which he (briefl y) contends that 
the practice of deportation in the U.S. and western Europe employs “not just police 
and immigration offi cials, but airline executives, pilots, stewards, and other pas-
sengers” ( 2002 ). Turning our attention from deportation, specifi cally, to migration, 
more broadly, the scope of this migration industry in the Gulf States can hardly be 
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understated. In addition to the police and immigration offi cials who manage the 
fl ow of labor to the Gulf States, the migration industry that connects labor with 
employment in the GCC includes a vast labor brokerage system in the sending 
countries, the sponsors and companies that employ workers in the receiving coun-
tries, the companies that build and oftentimes manage labor camps in the receiving 
countries, and much more. In Vinod’s case, he was able to extract very slight profi ts 
for his combined 6 years of work in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; some labor migrants 
actually lose money. The win/win/win implications of circular migration discourse 
fail to account for migration systems as exploitative, profi t-seeking industries. In 
the Gulf States, the “circularity” of these migration fl ows is a key component of a 
profi t-seeking migration industry whose interests are rarely aligned with those of 
labor migrants. 
 Finally, there is no doubt that for men like Vinod, the opportunity provided by 
work in the Gulf States is an attractive option. The fact that tens of millions of men 
and women are willing to gamble years of their time in the diffi cult context of labor 
relations in the Gulf is, in the fi nal accounting, a measure of the failure of develop-
ment in the states from which they come. In the longer history of migration, how-
ever, the circular migration discourse serves to codify the ongoing circumscription 
of host states’ responsibilities and obligations to the labor upon which they depend 
and from which they profi t. As Claude Meillassoux ( 1981 ) noted long ago, migra-
tion patterns of a circulatory nature allow highly developed capitalist zones to push 
the costs of the reproduction of their labor force back to underdeveloped and periph-
eral regions. This aptly describes the current situation in the Gulf States, where state 
and citizenry have come to deeply depend on the fl ow of a labor force whose rights 
are signifi cantly attenuated and who may never settle or naturalize. The costs of the 
reproduction of that labor force remain in the sending countries – in the communi-
ties and households to which aging and infi rm migrants return. In that sense, the 
promotion of circular migration in policy circles merely legitimizes the problematic 
realities – and, particularly, the enforced transience – of the migration industry 
already in place in the GCC. 
3.5  Concluding Thoughts: Circular Migration 
and the Gulf States 
 As all of this suggests, we fi nd the application of the circular migration framework 
in the GCC to be a problematic venture. In part, our argument points to a discursive 
understanding of the issue: as a conceptual framework and discourse, circular 
migration focuses our collective attention on certain aspects of the migration pro-
cess and pushes others out of the spotlight and into the shadows. One of those latter 
aspects, we suggest, is the lived experience of Gulf migration and, more broadly, 
the rights-based approach that typically accompanies it. Another is the collection of 
structural forces – poverty in the sending nations, the social context from which 
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many migrants come, the kafala that governs them in the Gulf – that readily con-
found simplistic renditions of migrant agency. Without attention to the lived experi-
ence of migration and the policies that shape it, the circular migration framework 
consists of a global “stamp of approval” for the involuntary movements that, from a 
distance, appear to be the manifestations of active circular migration. While rights-
based approaches to Gulf migration have been laden with their own problems, we 
suggest that the circular migration discourse and the policy recommendations that 
stem from it will codify many of the policies and practices that inevitably produce 
exploitative and problematic labor relations in the region, and through that process, 
slow down the substantial progress toward reform that has characterized the last 
decade in the GCC. 
 Our analysis of labor migration in the GCC also points to a second area of cri-
tique. The GCC states, like many wealthy states in the contemporary world, seek a 
highly fl exible and low-cost workforce to meet their developmental aspirations. 
Efforts to promote circular migration essentially validate these statal desires, and in 
doing so, yield to the purportedly 9 de facto norm of a contemporary world charac-
terized by profi table and highly unequal neoliberal fl ows. Essentially, the circular 
migration discourse and the policy schemes it promotes call for the formation of a 
second tier of rights for mobile non-citizens. In doing so, circular migration schemes 
abandon one of the most energetic and active fronts through which a constellation 
of perspectives grounded in universal humanism have challenged the purportedly 
de facto neoliberal norms. 
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